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CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AND GUNS: THE
IRRESISTIBLE MOVEMENT MEETS THE
IMMOVABLE OBJECT
David E. Patton*
ABSTRACT
The number of people incarcerated for federal firearm convictions has
increased ten-fold in the past 30 years. One of the biggest sources of the increase
is a Department of Justice initiative known as “Operation Triggerlock” in which
people who are arrested by state and local police for gun possession are
prosecuted in federal court for the express purpose of imposing more severe
prison sentences. The people prosecuted are overwhelmingly people of color.
Both Republican and Democratic politicians have supported the prosecutions:
the former as part of an overall law and order agenda and as a way to forestall
broader gun control legislation, and the latter as part of a larger effort to
regulate guns and to protect against criticism from the right about lack of
enforcement of the laws already on the books. This Article examines the history
of the prosecutions, including the policy reasons for them and the research on
their impact on crime which shows that the prosecutions have little to no impact.
The Article then reviews the various criticisms of the prosecutions, including
stark racial disparity, contribution to mass incarceration, harm to principles of
federalism, diminished civil liberties, and lack of effectiveness. It argues that the
uncertain benefits to public safety do not outweigh the known damage to fairness
and equality in the criminal justice system. Lastly, the Article considers the
prospects for reform in light of bipartisan support for criminal justice reform
generally and concludes that while minor reforms may come from Congress and
the Judiciary, any significant change is unlikely without a shift in charging
policy from the Department of Justice.
INTRODUCTION
Three decades ago, federal prosecutors began to fundamentally change the
nature of their work. They shifted focus from crimes with obvious interstate
connections to crimes that were once thought of as purely local.1 No single
*
Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York; Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law. Thank
you to the Emory Law Journal editorial team for their work on this Article.
1
Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties: Shooting Down the
Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1660–68 (2002); David E. Patton,
Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1440–41
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initiative captures this change better than “Operation Triggerlock.”2 Announced
by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 1991, Triggerlock led to
widespread federal prosecutions of so-called “felon-in-possession” cases.3
Using the law passed in 1968 making it a federal crime for anyone previously
convicted of a felony to possess a gun, federal prosecutors around the country
began coordinating with local police to charge people in federal court with
simple gun possession.4 The people arrested need not have used the gun in a
crime or traveled across state lines to be charged—the mere possession along
with a criminal history was enough.5 And if the person possessing the gun had
the right number and kind of prior convictions, he (almost all were men) faced
a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal
Act.6 Others who possessed the gun in connection with a drug crime or another
specified offense were subject to steep mandatory, consecutive sentences on top
of the sentences for the underlying crime, sometimes resulting in the equivalent
of life sentences.7
These changes significantly contributed to steep increases in incarceration,
particularly among men of color. In the first twenty years after Thornburgh’s
announcement, the number of people serving time in federal prison for weapons
possession jumped dramatically, a nearly tenfold increase from approximately
3,400 (5.8% of all federal prisoners) in 1990 to over 32,000 (15.1% of all federal
prisoners) in 2011.8 Although there have been fluctuations in the number of
cases over the years, to this day the number of people incarcerated in federal
prison for weapons offenses remains approximately 32,000.9 And from the
beginning of Triggerlock to the present, the vast majority of those prosecuted

(2011); Daniel Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ.
L. REV. 369, 374–75, 379 (2001) [hereinafter Richman, “Project Exile”]; Daniel Richman, The Past, Present,
and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 395–98 (2006) [hereinafter Richman, Violent
Crime Federalism]; see also JAMES A. STRAZELLA, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 17–18 (1998).
2
Beale, supra note 1, at 1675; Patton, supra note 1; Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 374–75;
Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 396–97.
3
Beale, supra note 1, at 1675; Patton, supra note 2; Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 374–75;
Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 396–97.
4
Patton, supra note 1.
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
6
§ 924(e).
7
§ 924(c).
8
Table 6.0023.2013: Prisoners Under the Jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, SOURCEBOOK
CRIM. JUST. STAT.: U. ALB., https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t600232013.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2020).
9
Inmate Statistics: Offenses, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_
inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Jan. 4, 2020).
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have been people of color. In 2018, consistent with most years, approximately
72% of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were Black or Hispanic.10
Although Democrats and Republicans agree on little when it comes to gun
control, federal felon-in-possession prosecutions have bridged the gap. The
prosecutions are consistent with Democrats’ efforts to restrict gun ownership
and useful to Republicans’ resistance to broader gun control regulation. And, of
course, there is the matter of who gets charged. The vast majority are poor people
of color, not exactly the Republican base.11 And in the 1990s when the initiatives
began, Clinton Democrats, including many influential black politicians, were
supporters of a host of “tough-on-crime” initiatives despite the impact on
communities of color.12
But the politics of criminal justice have changed dramatically in the past
several years. Conservative groups like Right on Crime, Americans for Tax
Reform, and Prison Fellowship have pushed to reduce America’s extraordinarily
high rates of incarceration.13 They have done so on libertarian, fiscal, and
religious grounds.14 And liberals, recovering from 1990s Clinton-era policies,
are doing the same on humanitarian and racial justice grounds.15 The confluence
has led to a public dialogue unimaginable a decade ago about reducing sentences
and reigning in prosecutions. Books like Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim
Crow, which argues that mass incarceration is a perpetuation of American’s dark
legacy of slavery and segregation, and Bryan Stevenson’s Just Mercy, which

10
Race of Federal Offenders by Type of Crime: Fiscal Year 2018, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table05.
pdf (showing 25.6% of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were non-Hispanic White, 52.8% were
Hispanic, and 18.7% were Black) (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
11
Alec Tyson, The 2018 Midterm Vote: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/08/the-2018-midterm-vote-divisions-by-race-gendereducation/; An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/.
12
See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA
3–14 (2017).
13
See, e.g., Bruce DuMont, The Christian Case for Criminal Justice Reform, REAL CLEAR POL. (Dec. 19,
2018), http://realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/12/19/the_christian_case_for_criminal_justice_refom_138959.
html; Bill Keller, Where Right Meets Left, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2015/02/20/where-right-meets-left; The Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://
rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
14
Supra note 13 and accompanying text.
15
See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Astead W. Herndon, ‘Lock the S.O.B.s Up’: Joe Biden and the Era of
Mass Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/joe-biden-crimelaws.html (reviewing Joe Biden’s and other Democrats’ role in passing “tough-on-crime” legislation in the 1980s
and 1990s which they are now apologizing for and backtracking from).
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details the author’s fight to reform the criminal justice system, have become
bestsellers and have entered the mainstream discourse.16
Actual reforms have been slow to follow the discourse. They range from
significant in some states, including legalization of recreational marijuana,17 bail
reform,18 and the election of prosecutors running on reform platforms (though
just how reformist they are is debatable),19 to baby steps in the federal system,
including a slight scaling back on certain mandatory minimum sentences,
retroactive application of a reduction in penalties for crack cocaine, and the
possibility of earlier release for some incarcerated people (though notably not
nearly all).20
So what has this meant for federal felon-in-possession prosecutions? So far,
nothing. Numbers dipped slightly from the Bush Administration to the Obama
Administration, but in the last year of the Obama presidency, prosecutions were
heading up and were more than 50% higher than in the last year of the Clinton
Administration.21 The Trump Administration has pushed them higher still and is
on track to bring the highest number of firearm prosecutions ever, surpassing the
previous high-water mark of 2004.22 The same political dynamics surrounding
gun control, and federal gun prosecutions, seem as firmly entrenched as ever.23

16

See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY

(2014).
17
Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (showing eleven states and the District of Columbia).
18
See, e.g., NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, & BAIL PRACTICES, BAIL REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
BASED ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE (2019).
19
See, e.g., Allan Smith, Progressive DAs Are Shaking Up the Criminal Justice System. Pro-Police
Groups Aren’t Happy, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/
these-reform-prosecutors-are-shaking-system-pro-police-groups-aren-n1033286. For a critical look at how
progressive these prosecutors are, see generally Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 748 (2018).
20
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5198–203, 5210–11, 5220. For an
explanation of the bill, see generally NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT
OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW (2019).
21
Federal Weapons Prosecutions Rise for Third Consecutive Year, TRAC REP. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://
trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/492/ (showing prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 were 4,461 in FY 2000 and
6,734 in FY 2016).
22
Federal Weapons Prosecutions Continue to Climb in 2019, TRAC REP. (June 5, 2019), https://trac.syr.
edu/tracreports/crim/560/.
23
See, e.g., Vittoria Elliot, Trump Quietly Backs Away from Stricter Gun Law Proposals After Mass
Shootings, INDEPENDENT (NOV. 1, 2019, 10:19 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uspolitics/trump-gun-reform-laws-mass-shootings-nra-a9181831.html; David Shortell et al., Proposal to Expand
Background Checks Floated on Hill but Trump Has Yet to Sign Off on It or Any Other Gun Plan, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/18/politics/guns-background-checks-congress-trump/index.html (last updated
Sept. 18, 2019).
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This Article examines the past three decades of federal gun possession
prosecutions. How did they come about in such large numbers? What have
scholars learned about the prosecutions’ impact on violent crime? How have the
prosecutions contributed to problems in the criminal justice system that are now
widely acknowledged? Do trade-offs exist, and, if so, are they worth it? Three
decades into this experiment, what have we learned, and where might we be
headed in light of those lessons?
Part I briefly discusses the history of federal gun possession prosecutions,
including a review of the research about the prosecutions’ impact on crime rates.
The research shows that we know relatively little about how the prosecutions
impact crime (consistent with the little we know about what affects crime rates
generally), but the few studies done suggest slight to no impact. Part II reviews
the various criticisms of the prosecutions, including stark racial disparity,
contribution to mass incarceration, harm to principles of federalism, diminished
civil liberties, and lack of effectiveness. I argue that the uncertain benefits to
public safety (as well as the real possibility that the prosecutions actually harm
public safety) do not outweigh the known damage to fairness and equality in the
criminal justice system. Lastly, in Part III, I examine the future of the
prosecutions by reviewing recent events in Congress, the Judiciary, and the
Executive. I conclude that while minor reforms have come from Congress and
the Judiciary in the past few years, and more are possible, fundamental change
will likely only come from a shift in charging policy from the Department of
Justice.
I.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS

A. The Origin Story
The extraordinary increase in gun possession prosecutions did not begin with
a new law. The federal law criminalizing gun possession for anyone with a prior
felony conviction was passed in 1968, and for twenty years it remained lightly
enforced.24 Light enforcement was consistent with the notion of a limited role
for the federal government in matters of local crimes. In the nearly 200 years of
country’s existence, federal involvement in criminal law had grown—but only
to a point.25 Initially reserved for crimes such as piracy and treason, federal law
enforcement had grown in the twentieth century to include a broader array of
offenses, but ones that still seemed to offer obvious advantages to federal rather
24
25

See Beale, supra note 1, at 1644; supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
See Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 383–89.
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than local intervention: interstate transportation of stolen property (particularly
cars), interstate kidnapping, immigration offenses, large-scale criminal
organizations, and perhaps more controversially, drug and Prohibition-era
alcohol offenses. The result was that after Prohibition was repealed, the federal
prison population remained incredibly constant. In 1940, there were 24,360
federal inmates.26 In 1980, there were 24,252.27
But in the 1970s and 1980s, with rising crime rates and a shifting political
dynamic that included the Republican “Southern Strategy” with its race-based
appeals to tough-on-crime policies, the politics of crime took the national
stage.28 In 1984 Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which
ushered in the federal sentencing guidelines and a host of tougher penalties for
drug crimes,29 as well as the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposed a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum for possessing a gun after having been
convicted of three qualifying felonies.30 Two years later, in the wake of the
overdose death (from powder cocaine) of star basketball player Len Bias,
Congress passed a wave of new mandatory minimum drug sentences, notably
creating the infamous 100-to-1 ratio for crack to powder cocaine with its
devastating racial disparities.31 But even with the new laws on the books and the
increase in drug prosecutions, gun possession prosecutions did not immediately
follow.32
The turning point came with Thornburgh’s announcement in 1991 of Project
Triggerlock. Although federal firearm prosecutions had increased steadily
throughout the 1980s, those prosecutions were not the result of any formalized
program and were likely incident to overall increases in federal prosecution,
26

Id. at 389.
Id.
28
Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN (Mar. 24,
2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/
index.html (quoting President Nixon’s former domestic policy chief, John Ehrlichman, about the political
strategy of using the criminal justice system to battle Nixon’s “two enemies: the antiwar left and black people”);
see also Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-how-president-nixon-tied-addiction-tocrime/254319/; Rick Perlstein, Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy, NATION
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interviewsouthern-strategy/ (quoting the racist remarks of Lee Atwater in explaining the Republican’s “Southern
Strategy” and noting that as George H.W. Bush’s campaign manager, Atwater ran the infamous Willie Horton
ad with its race-baiting appeal to tough on crime policies).
29
Richman, Violent Crime Federalism, supra note 1, at 394–95.
30
Id. at 394.
31
Adam Davidson, Learning from History in Changing Times: Taking Account of Evolving Marijuana
Laws in Federal Sentencing, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2105, 2130–34 (2016).
32
See Richman, “Project Exile”, supra note 1, at 395–96.
27
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particularly the increase in drug and organized crime prosecutions where
firearms were involved.33 Project Triggerlock changed that. The stated goal was
for federal prosecutors to “protect the public by putting the most dangerous
offenders in prison for as long as the law allows” by using the “full force of
federal sentences with a commitment to no plea bargaining.”34
Daniel Richman has written extensively about the history of Triggerlock and
notes that it was announced at a time of heated debate about the Brady Bill, a
package of gun control measures that Democrats generally favored and
Republicans opposed.35 At the time of the announcement, the Bush
Administration strongly opposed the legislation, but momentum for it had been
building, particularly with the endorsement of former President Reagan in a
statement from George Washington University Medical Center where he had
been treated after being shot eight years earlier.36 A political dynamic developed
that persists to this day: Republicans opposed broad gun control legislation, and
as part of that opposition, supported stronger law enforcement efforts against
illegal gun possession. As Professor Richman puts it:
Gun control minimalists support offender-specific criminal
enforcement as an alternative to broader regulation of trafficking and
access. And advocates of broader regulation embrace such
enforcement programs as well, both as a shield against minimalist
criticism and because their regulatory scheme naturally includes this
sort of criminal enforcement.37

Triggerlock prosecutions waxed and waned in the several years following
Thornburgh’s announcement.38 The Clinton Administration did not disavow it;
indeed, many of the Clinton-appointed United States Attorneys touted it.39 But
in 1997 both sides of the political debate cheered one highly visible Triggerlock
program that would become a template for others around the country: Project
Exile.
Project Exile was an initiative started by the United States Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond. It was led by the then-head of
the Richmond office, James Comey. Comey (the now famous former FBI
33

See id. at 396.
Id. at 374 (quoting Attorney General Richard Thornburgh).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 410.
38
See id. at 375–76.
39
See id. at 376, 382. But during the time before and after the Brady Bill’s passage in 1993, Republicans
criticized the Administration for not bringing enough prosecutions. See id. at 390.
34
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Director) described it as “Triggerlock on steroids”40 and explained that it
involved a collaboration between federal and state law enforcement whereby,
“When a police officer finds a gun during the officer’s duties, the officer pages
an ATF agent (twenty-four hours a day). They review the circumstances and
determine whether a federal statute applies. If so, federal criminal prosecution is
initiated.”41
Far from the initial language of Triggerlock about targeting America’s “most
dangerous offenders,”42 Exile was sweeping in its approach. If a federal statute
applied, anyone found with a gun would be charged in federal court.43
The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Helen Fahey,
explained the advantages of federal prosecutions: lower likelihood of bail,
harsher sentences, and a federal prison system that meant serving time in a
distant location (hence the name “Exile”).44 Media outreach in Richmond was
extensive, including television ads, billboards, and even coordination with
NRA-sponsored “Eddie Eagle Gun Safety” programs for elementary school
children.45 Within a year, Exile seemed to have a dramatic impact on homicides,
with Richmond experiencing a 33% reduction between 1997 and 1998.46
Exile was soon publicized and politicized nationally. Although the program
occurred in a Democratic administration, it was Republicans who capitalized on
its apparent success.47 The NRA made it a cornerstone of their message as gun
control debates continued to rage, especially after the Columbine High School
shooting in Colorado.48 The familiar dynamic played out. Gun control opponents
insisted that additional laws and broader regulatory requirements were
unnecessary: The laws on the books were sufficient—they just needed to be
enforced by programs like Exile.49 And gun control proponents took what they
could get, naturally supportive of anti-gun enforcement policies and tactically
concerned about criticism from the right if they opposed such enforcement.

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 379 n.63.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 379 n.66.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381.
See id.
Id. at 384.
See id. at 382–86.
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With both sides of the aisle on board, the number of federal gun possession
prosecutions soon skyrocketed.50
B. The Expansion
Exile was widely replicated in districts throughout the country via an
umbrella DOJ program called Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).51 PSN was
developed by the George W. Bush Administration and was designed to increase
federal prosecutions and sentences as part of a broader strategy to reduce violent
crime. In addition to the increased prosecutions, PSN strategies included: (1)
“offender notification meetings,” adapted from a Boston program called
Ceasefire, which involved small meetings with parolees and probationers to
inform them of the new prosecution policies, and to offer job training and social
services assistance; (2) media campaigns advertising the prosecution initiative;
(3) increased home visits to parolees and probationers; and (4) research to
identify increased criminal activity in order to increase police presence in those
areas.52
The PSN “toolkit,” the package of materials sent to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
explaining the program and acting as a guide to developing PSN initiatives,
explained the benefits of federal gun prosecutions: longer sentences and more
restrictive bail laws. Those “benefits” accrued even when gun cases remained in
the state courts because of the additional leverage the possibility of federal
prosecutions provided to local prosecutors. “In some jurisdictions, state
prosecutors offer violent gun criminals the option of receiving a higher-thanusual state sentence in lieu of federal prosecution, which may carry an even
higher sentence.”53 Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the idea was
“disarmingly simple: federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and
prosecutors working together to investigate, arrest, and prosecute criminals with
guns to get the maximum penalties available under state or federal law.”54
Since its inception in 2001, PSN has spent billions of dollars supporting state
and federal law enforcement to carry out its programming and it has impacted
federal prosecutions in every federal district in the country. According to
50

See id. at 380–81.
See EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS - A NATIONAL PROGRAM TO
REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT iii (2009).
52
Id. at 9–10.
53
Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority
Communities
for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 317 (2007).
54
Id. at 307 n.4.
51
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subsequent studies, although many districts ramped up the prosecution
component of PSN, the other non-prosecutorial components such as notification
meetings and supportive services, were much less frequently and sporadically
implemented.55 One noteworthy example of the expansion was James Comey
personally bringing a version of Exile from Richmond to the Southern District
of New York when he became that district’s U.S. Attorney during the George
W. Bush Administration. It too focused almost entirely on the prosecutorial
component of PSN.56
C. The Impact
Researchers conducted several studies in the 2000s in an attempt to measure
federal gun possession prosecutions’ impact on crime rates. In 2003, Steven
Raphael and Jens Ludwig conducted what is generally considered the most
rigorous statistical analysis of Richmond’s homicide rates and Project Exile and
found that the prosecutions likely had no impact.57 The highly-touted drop in
homicides was almost certainly due to a regression to the mean. The year before
Exile was implemented, Richmond saw a spike, and its drop was entirely
consistent with other cities that also saw dramatic decreases without an Exiletype program. Even within Richmond, other populations unaffected by Exile,
namely juveniles, also saw decreases in crime. Shortly after the study was
released, one commentator, Peter Greenwood, the founder of the RAND
Corporation’s evidence-based criminal justice program stated: “Steven Raphael
and Jens Ludwig have demonstrated fairly conclusively that one of the more
popular strategies developed during the past decade to reduce firearm violence
is a bust. It has no impact. It does not work.”58
Other studies were slightly more qualified. Richard Rosenfeld and others
studied Exile along with several other law enforcement initiatives and concluded
that the results in Richmond “inspire somewhat greater confidence in the
existence of a difference between Richmond’s firearm homicide trend and the
average trend for the sample [of the ninety-five largest U.S. cities], although the
differences may have been quite small.”59
55
See MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51, at 138, 142 (noting that of the 252 large cities in which PSN
was implemented, 170 were considered “low dosage” with “dosage” referring to the various components of the
programming).
56
See id. at 7.
57
See Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Project Exile, in
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 254 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003).
58
Peter Greenwood, Comment, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 280
(Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003).
59
Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &
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In 2009 the Department of Justice commissioned its own broader study of
PSN nationwide.60 Perhaps not surprisingly, the study painted a rosier picture of
the program’s impact than did the earlier independent studies. But even
accepting the report’s conclusions of a 4.1% decrease in crime in PSN target
cities as compared to a 0.9% drop in crime in non-PSN target cities, it is hard to
say much about the impact of the gun prosecutions alone. Because of PSN’s
multi-pronged approach and the wide variation in implementation of the
different prongs (from community outreach to law enforcement training to
media campaigns) the study does not provide valid data about federal
prosecutions and crime rates. A more detailed study of a PSN program in
Chicago showed a significant impact on homicide rates, but attributed the
majority of the impact to (1) the “forums” in which people recently placed on
probation or parole attended meetings with community members to discuss
increased gun prosecutions; (2) crime in the neighborhood; (3) why they were
collaborating to reduce it, and various available social services such as substance
abuse treatment; (4) mental health counseling; and (5) job training and
placement.61 According to the researchers, “the only variable not to have a
significant effect was the person-month sentence received from PSN
prosecution.”62
The 2009 study appears to be the last effort to empirically assess the impact
of PSN.
II. CRITICISMS OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS
There have been a host of criticisms of federal gun possession prosecutions.
They span the political spectrum and have been leveled for many years.
A. Racial Disparity
Racial disparity has been a part of felon-in-possession prosecutions from the
start. In an equal protection challenge to Project Exile in Richmond, the parties
stipulated that 90% of defendants were African-American, and the court
PUB. POL’Y 419, 438 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
60
See MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51, at iii–vi.
61
See Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in
Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 231–32 (2007); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND
CRIME PREVENTION 4, 11 (2009) (referring to the Papachristos study as the “best evaluation to date” and
summarizing other studies and concluding, “[i]n general, the certainty, and to a lesser extent, the swiftness of
sanction mattered more than the severity of sanction, to the extent that many researchers concluded that severity
was all but or in fact irrelevant”).
62
Papachristos et al., supra note 61, at 260.
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lamented “the inability of prosecutors to explain the procedure” for diverting
cases from state court for more serious punishment in federal court which cast
“some doubt on the assertion that race plays no role in deciding whether a case
is to be federally prosecuted.”63 The challenge ultimately failed, and over the
years, federal prosecutors in other districts have charged gun possession cases
at similarly skewed rates, with the percentage of Black defendants (categories
used by the Sentencing Commission) in many districts routinely over 80% and
90%.64 In a 2007 article, Bonita Gardner detailed the cities and neighborhoods
that PSN targeted and showed how the demographics of the targeted
communities assured a stark racial imbalance.65 That skewed targeting continues
to this day. In 2017, nationwide, over 70% of all persons sentenced in federal
court for unlawful possession of a firearm were Black or Hispanic.66
In addition to the location of the PSN target communities, the racial disparity
also arises from the type of firearm offenses charged. In discussing the disparity
in gun possession prosecutions, Gardner questioned the choice of the federal
government to prosecute felon-in-possession cases but not the “other twenty
major federal gun crimes—including gun trafficking, corrupt gun dealers, stolen
guns, selling to minors, obliterating serial numbers, and lying on the background
check form.”67 Indeed, the numbers paint a stark divide between simple
possession prosecutions and offenses related to gun trafficking. In 2018, less
than 5% of all federal firearm prosecutions involved trafficking or registration
offenses.68
Benjamin Levin recently argued that many of the critiques of the war on
drugs apply with equal force to firearm prosecutions, and in particular, the
decision to target those with prior felony convictions which may well “reinscribe
the inequalities of the drug war.”69 Levin reminds us that “defining a crime is a
political act, and the decision that an individual with a criminal record for drug

63
See United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also United States v. Thorpe,
471 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2006). For a full discussion of the case, see Dominique Camm, Reversing the
Standard: The Difficulty in Proving Selective Prosecution, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2008).
64
See Gardner, supra note 53, at 316; Patton, supra note 2, at 1443.
65
See Gardner, supra note 53, at 316–17.
66
Race of Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category, Fiscal Year: 2017, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source
books/2017/Table04.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2020).
67
Gardner, supra note 53, at 312.
68
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND SPECIFIC OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 55 (2018).
69
Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2197 (2016).
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offenses cannot possess a gun lawfully rests on a political definition not only
about guns, but about drugs as well.”70
What makes these racial disparities particularly troubling is how intentional
the prosecutorial decisions are. Federal felon-in-possession prosecutions
overwhelmingly come from local police arrests in which the person arrested
would otherwise face state charges.71 The decision whether to prosecute
someone federally is not a decision between prosecution or no prosecution—it’s
a decision between state or federal prosecution. That is, even compared to the
enormous discretion prosecutors normally exercise, these decisions are highly
discretionary. PSN specifically targets communities of color for punishment
above and beyond what would already be significant punishment in state court.
When it comes to racial disparity, some of the direct federal law enforcement
arrests are even more troubling than the transferred state cases. They often
involve stings by the DEA and ATF which overwhelmingly target people of
color. A common operation that has been heavily criticized, but still persists, is
the so-called fake “stash-house” sting.72 In the operations, federal agents use
cooperating informants to convince people that an apartment or house contains
hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of drugs or drug proceeds that can be
easily burgled or robbed.73 The informant tells the target to find and bring other
people and guns to a meet-up location.74 At the appointed location, the agents
arrest everyone who shows up and charge them with assorted federal robbery,
drug, and firearms charges that often carry decades of mandatory prison time.75
Two recent selective enforcement challenges to this practice in the Southern
District of New York show overwhelming racial disparities. In one, a survey of
fake stash-house sting cases revealed that in the five-year period between 2013
and 2018, the operations targeted 144 individuals, 141 of whom (97.9%) were
Black or Latino, two of whom were Asian, and one of whom was White.76 The
other, using slightly different data, showed that over a ten-year period, of 179
reverse-sting defendants, none were White and all but two were Black or
70

Id.
Patton, supra note 1, at 1464.
72
See, e.g., Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA TODAY (June 28,
2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-todayinvestigation/2457109/ (noting that more than 1,000 individuals have been prosecuted following similar “stashhouse” stings).
73
See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x. 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 302–03 (9th Cir. 2013)).
74
See id. (quoting Black, 733 F.3d at 302–03).
75
See id. (quoting Black, 733 F.3d at 302–03).
76
United States v. Garcia-Pena, 17 Cr. 363, 2018 WL 6985220, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
71
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Hispanic.77 These astonishingly skewed figures occurred in a federal district that
is 43.1% White (non-Latino), 31.4% Latino, and 16.7% Black (non-Latino). In
the Northern District of Illinois, only six out of ninety-four defendants charged
in fake stash-house sting cases were White and non-Hispanic, figures the
Seventh Circuit referred to as “troubling” in ordering limited discovery into the
reasons and criteria for the prosecutions.78
The constitutional challenges to the arrests and prosecutions have had mixed
success,79 but regardless of the merits of the equal protection claims, the policy
criticisms on racial disparity grounds are compelling. Sixth Circuit Judge Jane
Stranch, in a concurring opinion denying a motion to dismiss on due process
grounds, wrote:
I write separately to express my discomfort with the governmental
operation known as a “stash house sting.” Because these stings are
wholly inventions of law enforcement agents, they can and do include
powerful inducements to participate in one big “hit,” a hit that is
conveniently large enough to qualify for mandatory minimum
sentences. Obtaining the outsized reward is also made to look easy—
the agent is a disgruntled insider who knows when and how to stage
these “rip-and-runs” and offers to provide all needed assistance, from
manpower to transportation. The unseemly nature of the
Government’s activity is emphasized by its failure to achieve its
declared goals of jailing dangerous criminals and making our streets
safer. Evidence showing that these hurry-up set-ups achieve the stated
goals was not proffered and the facts here demonstrate why: no known
dangerous individuals or criminal enterprises were researched or
targeted and no pre-existing drug rings or conspiracies were broken
up. In fact, this sting trapped Flowers, a gainfully employed young
man with no criminal record. We have this result because informants
were simply sent out into the community to gather information and
find someone who would bite at the opportunity to make loads of
money quickly. And, in line with sting statistics, the men recruited here
were all African American and all from impoverished areas—as are

77
Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face Scrutiny in New York,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10-years-179-arrests-nowhite-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f6462242-12ce-11ea-bf62eadd5d11f559_story.html.
78
United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015).
79
Courts have required defendants to show that similarly situated Whites could have been but were not
targeted, a standard that is nearly impossible to meet and is a highly questionable method for detecting
discrimination. For a thorough explanation of why this “counterfactual causal” model is so flawed, see generally
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting
Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163 (2019).
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the overwhelming number of stash-house-sting targets across the
nation.80

Just as Levin reminds us that defining a crime is a political act, so too is the
decision about whether, how, and against whom to charge a crime, and as a
practical matter, it is likely a more significant one. And the racially disparate
federal charging decisions in gun cases are not just a product of conservative
political acts. . The reverse-sting and felon-in-possession prosecutions have been
pursued by Attorneys General and U.S. Attorneys from both ends of the political
spectrum. Legal historian Anders Walker has written about the liberal
contribution to racial inequality in the criminal legal system and cites liberal
support for tough on crime policies for firearms offenses as a prime example.81
He argues that Michelle Alexander’s thesis in The New Jim Crow, comparing
conservative wedge politics and the war on drugs to formalized racial
segregation, misses the “current liberal enthusiasm for federal gun regulation”
as a significant “contributor to black incarceration.”82
B. Over-Incarceration
Federal gun possession cases are no small part of overall federal
prosecutions. Firearm offenses are the third highest category of federal
prosecutions, behind only drugs and immigration.83 And they represent the
second highest offense type of people serving time in federal prison behind only
drugs.84 Nearly 20% of all federal prisons are incarcerated for a weapons
offense.85
The point of the prosecutions as stated by the originators of the programs is
to impose harsher sentences than would otherwise be imposed in state court, and
to drive up state court sentences by using the threat of federal prosecution as
leverage. This last point is significant. Although the vast majority of criminal
cases, and therefore the vast source of mass incarceration, come from state
systems, the federal prosecutions impact those systems tremendously by
providing state prosecutors greater power to negotiate tougher pleas.

80

Flowers, 712 F. App’x. at 508–09 (Stranch, J., concurring).
Anders Walker, The New Jim Crow? Recovering the Progressive Origins of Mass Incarceration, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 871 (2014).
82
Id. at 873.
83
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2019)
(demonstrating that firearm offenses make up approximately 11% of federal offenses).
84
Inmate Statistics: Offenses, supra note 10.
85
Id.
81
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Levin argues convincingly that “like criminal drug statutes, existing and
proposed criminal gun possession statutes should also trigger skepticism from
critics of mass incarceration.”86 He details the ways in which gun possession
prosecutions and the war on drugs share the same misguided pathology of using
the criminal law and extremely severe sentences as the regulatory tool of
choice.87
In the drug context, the use of criminal law to handle a public health
crisis ultimately merged with a strong punitive streak, yielding a
regulatory regime undergirded with violent moralism. Shaped by this
preference for incarceration, the criminal gun statutes in the federal
system and in many states advance a web of exponentially advancing
sentences. Like drug crime offenses, possessory drug offenses quickly
multiply, allowing prosecutors to stack charges and to extend
significantly the prison term that a defendant faces. The end result is a
legal regime that—much like drug prohibition—feeds into a growing
carceral population.88

Nowhere have the sentences been more troubling than in the extreme cases
of prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c) requires a mandatory
five-year sentence for anyone possessing a gun “during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”89 The penalty increases to seven
years if the gun was brandished, and ten years if it was discharged. A sentence
under 924(c) must run consecutively to any other sentence.90 And each “second
or subsequent conviction” for Section 924(c) requires an additional mandatory,
consecutive twenty-five years.91 This has meant the equivalent of life sentences
for many people who engaged in serious criminal conduct but who were
sentenced far more severely than the average person convicted of murder.92 As
discussed further below, the recently passed First Step Act has ameliorated some
of the harshest aspects of this so-called “stacking” of charges, but the law did
not provide any retroactive relief. One well-publicized example of the harshness
of the prosecutions was Weldon Angelos, who was sentenced in federal court in
Salt Lake City, Utah to fifty-five years in prison at the age of twenty-five for

86

Levin, supra note 69, at 2213.
Id. at 2214–15.
88
Levin, supra note 69, at 2215.
89
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Danielle Kaeble, Time Served in State Prisons, 2016, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Nov. 2018), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp16.pdf (showing the median time served for all degrees of murder nationwide is
13.4 years).
87
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selling marijuana three times while possessing a gun.93 Just a few other cases
include:









Eric Andrews, who was 19 when he engaged in several robberies
over a one-month period of time and was sentenced in federal court
in Philadelphia in 2006 to 311 years in prison;94
Kittrell Decator, who was sentenced in 1995 to 53 years in prison
in federal court in Baltimore for three bank robberies in which
nobody was physically injured;95
Ronnie Lynn Fowler, who was sentenced in 1992 to 45 years in
prison in federal court in Dallas for five night-deposit robberies in
which nobody was physically injured;96
Kevin Haynes, who was sentenced to 46 years in federal court in
Brooklyn in 1993 for four bank robberies in which nobody was
physically injured;97
Kepa Maumau, who was sentenced to 57 years in 2011 in federal
court in Salt Lake City for a series of robberies in which nobody
was physically injured;98
Ian Owens, who was sentenced to 117 years in 2005 in federal court
in the Eastern District of Michigan for committing a series of bank
robberies in which nobody was seriously injured;99
Derrick Redd, who was sentenced to 50 years in 1997 in federal
court in Alexandria, Virginia for four bank robberies in which
nobody was physically injured;100
Robert Rollings, who was sentenced to 106 years in 2001 in federal
court in Chicago for participating in four bank robberies in which
nobody was physically injured;101

93
Adam Liptak, Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/us/long-term-in-drug-case-fuels-debate-on-sentencing.html; Eileen Sullivan,
Shorter Sentences, More Judicial Leeway: What the Criminal Justice Bill Would Do, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/sentencing-prison-bill.html. In 2016, Angelos was
resentenced and released after thirteen years of intense media coverage of his case. Jason Kitchen, After 13 Years
in Prison, Weldon Angelos Is a Free Man, HUFFPOST (June 8, 2016, 8:14 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
after-13-years-in-prison-_b_10322000. Prosecutors agreed to vacate one of the 924(c) convictions, but the
details are sealed. Id.
94
United States v. Andrews, 2:05 Cr. 280 (ER) (E.D. Pa.).
95
Decator v. United States, No. 1:95-cr-202, 2013 WL 12344772 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 2013).
96
United States v. Fowler, No. 4:92-cr-177, 2012 WL 12871653 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2012).
97
United States v. Haynes, 93 Cr. 1043 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y.).
98
United States v. Maumau, No. 2:08-cr-758, 2020 WL 806121 (D. Utah Feb. 18, 2020).
99
United States v. Owens, 02 Cr. 226 (E.D. Mi.).
100
United States v. Redd, 97 Cr 06 (E.D. Va.).
101
United States v. Rollings, 99 Cr. 771 (N.D. Ill.).
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Gregory Rose, who was sentenced to 90 years in 2005 in federal
court in Albany, New York for participating in a series of bank
robberies in which nobody was physically injured.102

These are only some of the dozens of cases in which “stacked” 924(c)
convictions have mandated sentences that are wholly disproportionate to the
conduct and far lengthier than punishment for more serious crimes.103 While the
924(c) prosecutions are not necessarily part of a district’s Triggerlock program
(e.g., bank robberies are usually investigated by federal law enforcement from
the outset), they represent the more extreme end of the spectrum of federal
firearm prosecutions’ harsh contribution to mass incarceration.
C. Privacy and Libertarian Criticisms
There have also been criticisms of federal gun possession prosecutions on
libertarian grounds—beyond the mere “keep your hands off my guns” variety.
Possessory offenses rely heavily on searches for detection. A gun kept in a
nightstand or closet or car trunk won’t be found unless police make an effort to
look in those places. And so they find ways to look there. In this way, the
prosecutions contribute to an unhealthy amount of police and prosecutorial
power. Referring to New York City’s now much-maligned “stop and frisk”
practices, Levin notes that “it was guns as much, if not more so, than drugs that
justified the aggressive and intrusive practice.”104 He also notes that it was guns
more so than drugs that provided the basis for some of the broader exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on searches and seizures.105 “Even as the
Warren Court was expanding the protections afforded to criminal defendants
and curbing police abuses, it relied on concern for officer safety in the gun
possession context to carve out what would become the critical exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.”106
Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have repeatedly
fought to shield police officers who violate the Fourth Amendment in felon-inpossession cases and were found untruthful by federal judges in suppression
hearings.107 A New York Times investigation revealed at least twenty cases
102

United States v. Rose, 3:04 Cr. 067 (N.D.N.Y.).
For analysis and criticism of the Section 924(c) mandatory sentencing regime by the United States
Sentencing Commission, see generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2011).
104
Levin, supra note 69, at 2202.
105
Id.
106
Id. (footnote omitted).
107
David E. Patton, Policing the Poor and the Two Faces of the Justice Department, 44 FORDHAM URB.
103
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where NYPD officers’ testimony was found to be “unreliable, inconsistent,
twisting the truth, or just plain false” and where federal prosecutors had
defended the conduct and no adverse personnel action was ever taken against
the officers.108
Many of the constitutional violations never come to light because of the
nature of federal criminal practice in which less than 3% of cases go to trial and
prosecutors leverage the threat of severe mandatory sentences to obtain pleas
without a challenge to police conduct.109
D. Federalism
Lastly, there have also been criticisms of Triggerlock nearly from the start
on federalism grounds. Traditional conservatives ask: Why is the federal
government involving itself in what should rightfully be local policing? What
happened to our aversion to a national domestic police force? One commentator
cited Triggerlock as part of an “impending crisis in the federal justice system”
that is “the product of a pervasive failure to recognize that federal courts are an
exhaustible resource designed to play a specialized role in the justice system.”110
In 1991, Chief Justice William Rehnquist lamented a proposal in Congress to
expand federal jurisdiction even further over offenses committed with guns,
writing that the law would be “inconsistent with long-accepted concepts of
federalism” and “would swamp federal prosecutors” at the expense of other
priorities.111
Sara Sun Beale argued convincingly that two of the blockbuster Supreme
Court opinions of the 1990s, United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison, which were widely viewed as part of a natural conservative effort to
restrict the scope of the Commerce Clause and federal authority generally, are
more properly seen as a tailored response to the Court’s concern about turning
federal courts into “police courts,” reducing their exclusivity and diminishing

L.J. 1431, 1441 (2017).
108
See Benjamin Weiser, Police in Gun Searches Face Disbelief in Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/nyregion/12guns.html.
109
David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013)
110
John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673,
699 (1999); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1165 (2005); see also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1006 (1995).
111
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1991 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (1992).
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their prestige.112 The failure of an anticipated post-Lopez Commerce Clause
revolution to materialize suggests she was right.
E. High Costs and Few Benefits
In assessing the costs and benefits of the prosecutions, a natural starting point
is the stated rationale for them: violent crime reduction. There is no question that
the stated goals of the prosecutions are grounded in utilitarian justifications. All
of the statements by the law enforcement founders and proponents of the
prosecutions tout their role in reducing violent crime.113 This is not surprising:
Retributive rationales for federal prosecutions and harsh sentences are weak.
There is nothing inherently wrong with possessing a gun in America. In fact, it
is lauded by many as exercising a cherished constitutional right.114 It is only
wrong to own a gun if you are a certain type of person, namely someone with a
felony conviction. It is a regulatory rationale, a malum prohibitum offense, that
depends on a determination that the people identified pose a risk worthy of
criminal sanction (as opposed to, or in addition to, other forms of possible
regulation).
Given the stated utilitarian concerns, it ought to be of particular concern
whether the prosecutions are in fact useful. That is, do they in fact improve
public safety and drive down crime rates? As noted, the empirical research on
the relationship between federal gun possession prosecutions and crime rates
strongly suggests that the prosecutions have little to no impact. The research
comports with more general scholarship about what works to reduce crime.
There is near unanimity among scholars that of the potential means of
deterring crime, certainty of detection is the most important and severity of
punishment is the least important. People who engage in unlawful activity rarely
engage in the sort of long-term cost/benefit calculation that would be necessary
for increased amounts of punishment to impact decision-making. As I have
written about previously, federal gun possession prosecutions are particularly
vulnerable to deterrence critiques because they do nothing to increase the
perceived odds of detection (which remains almost entirely dependent on local
police activity).115 In addition, whatever small amount of deterrence might come
from increased length of punishment is dependent on the person who might

112
113
114
115

Beale, supra note 1, at 1655–57.
MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 51.
See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Patton, supra note 1, at 1460.
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potentially possess a gun to be aware of the punishment.116 Hurdles to the PSNtargeted population’s knowledge of federal sentences and the possibility of
federal prosecution are high. The vast majority of weapons and violent crime
offenses are still prosecuted in state court.117 Anyone with a felony who is
familiar with the court system is far more likely to be familiar with the state
courts as opposed to federal courts.118 Plucking out a comparatively small
number of cases to prosecute in federal court leads to what Sara Sun Beale long
ago termed the “cruel lottery.”119 Not only is it cruel but it is likely ineffective.120
A federal judge recently agreed with these principles. In 2017 in the Eastern
District of New York, District Judge Jack Weinstein held an evidentiary hearing
in a gun possession sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
government’s claims about the deterrent effects of a lengthy prison sentence
were justified.121 In concluding they were not, he relied heavily on the testimony
of law professor and criminologist, Jeffrey Fagan, who explained the consensus
view of empirical researchers that the “deterrent effect of criminal sanctions are
specific to the risks of detection, not to the severity of punishments.”122 In other
words, people are typically deterred by their perceived odds of getting caught,
not how long their sentence might be. Judge Weinstein quoted at length from
Dr. Fagan’s testimony in finding that a long sentence would serve neither a
general nor a specific deterrent purpose:
[Potential offenders] have no idea whether a case is going to be
[prosecuted] if they’re caught . . . [T]hey have no way of estimating
whether that case is going to be tried in federal court with a longer
[sentence under a federal statute], or in a state court with a somewhat
shorter sentence.
....
I think it’s unlikely [for] Mr. Lawrence . . . under the theory of specific
deterrence[] or in general for people in the . . . community in which
Mr. Lawrence lives, that being given . . . an enhanced sentence, under
the federal guidelines, under a federal statute, would have much of a
deterrent effect either for him or in general in the community. Only
were there to be extraordinary measures to disseminate that
information would there be the possibility of deterrence. But all of the

116

Id. at 1432.
Id. at 1464.
118
Id. at 1442.
119
Beale, supra note 110, at 997.
120
Patton, supra note 1, at 1444.
121
United States v. Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
122
Affidavit of Jeffrey Fagan at 3, United States v. Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No.
16-cr-243).
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research that we’ve done including on gun crimes suggest that even
where there’s knowledge of lengthy sentences that’s not the key to
deterrence. The key to deterrence is the risk of punishment.123

Judge Weinstein’s findings comport with the overwhelming consensus of
criminologists that severity of sentence (the primary justification for
Triggerlock) does little, if anything, to deter crime.124
Perhaps more surprising is that even some large-scale efforts to increase
detection of firearms have shown weak results. The widespread practice of “stop
and frisk” by police in New York City, in which police aggressively looked for
excuses to stop and search enormous numbers of minority residents in mostly
poor neighborhoods for the express purpose of finding guns, likely had no
impact on crime rates.125 When the practice was discontinued after a federal
judge found the practice unconstitutional, crime rates continued to fall—to
levels not seen in at least sixty years.126 This is despite the fact that stops went
from 685,724 at their height in 2011 to 11,627 in 2017.127 Mayor Michael
Bloomberg has since apologized for the policy after years of defending it, saying
now that he got it “really wrong.”128
When stacked against the criticisms leveled above (racial disparity,
contribution to mass incarceration, damage to traditional preference for state
courts as a venue for local crime, and the erosion of personal liberty that comes
from unconstitutional police searches), the lack of any clear benefit in crime
reduction is particularly troubling.129
III. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL GUN POSSESSION PROSECUTIONS
Federal gun possession prosecutions have proved remarkably durable
despite the criticism from both the left and right.130 Of course, part of the
123

Lawrence, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 445–46.
See generally Patton, supra note 1.
125
Ashley Southall & Michael Gold, Why ‘Stop and Frisk’ Inflamed Black and Hispanic Neighborhoods,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/nyregion/bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-newyork.html; see also Ames Grawert & James Cullen, Fact Sheet: Stop and Frisk’s Effect on Crime in New York
City, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/factsheet-stop-and-frisks-effect-crime-new-york-city; German Lopez, A Conservative Columnist Admits It: “We
Were Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk”, VOX (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/8/
16865730/national-review-stop-and-frisk-police.
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Southall & Gold, supra note 125.
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durability has been the praise from both the left and right. So, after thirty years,
what have we learned that might provide lessons for the current moment? With
talk of criminal justice reform from both sides of the political aisle, is there real
potential to rethink federal prosecution of gun possession?
Below, I discuss recent developments from each of the three branches and
what they might mean for the future.
A. Congress
Congress is unlikely to revisit anytime soon the wisdom of the statutory basis
for most federal gun prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). There have not been any
such proposals, and measures well short of repealing Section 922(g) have been
met with heavy resistance.131 But there are realistic prospects for reforming some
of the most draconian sentencing provisions relating to gun possession.
Last year, Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA).132 Unlike the previous
generation of criminal legal legislation, the FSA mostly reduced severity (albeit
only slightly) through provisions that impact sentencing and corrections.
Examples of the sentencing reform included the retroactive application of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which somewhat (though not entirely) ameliorated
the 100-to-1 crack to powder cocaine sentencing disparity (making it 18-to-1),133
and a broadening of the so-called Safety Valve, allowing a slight expansion for
a way out of mandatory minimum sentences for people charged with drug
crimes.134
With respect to firearms, there was one major reform: an amendment to part
of the “stacking” provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).135 Recall from the discussion
above that each “second or subsequent conviction” for Section 924(c) required
an additional mandatory, consecutive twenty-five years.136 The Supreme Court
interpreted that provision such that it did not require a previous final conviction

131
See, e.g., Tim Mack & Betsy Swan, Why Did Ted Cruz Suddenly Get Tough on Gun Possession?,
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-did-ted-cruz-suddenly-get-toughon-gun-possession; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Sen. Tom Cotton’s Claim That Sentencing Reform Bill Would Release
‘Thousands of Violent Felons’, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
fact-checker/wp/2016/02/08/sen-tom-cottons-claim-that-sentencing-reform-bill-would-release-thousands-ofviolent-felons/.
132
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
133
See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 110-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 1–2 (2019).
134
First Step Act § 402.
135
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).
136
Id.
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and could include multiple counts in the same indictment.137 In other words, a
person charged with three counts of robbery or distributing drugs while
possessing a firearm, would be sentenced to a mandatory term of fifty-five years
in prison to be served consecutively to the sentence for the robbery or drug
offense (and any other crime of conviction). This was so even if the person had
committed all of the conduct on the same day (e.g., engaging in three separate
drug transactions while possessing a gun). The First Step Act changed the
“stacking” language to require that before the enhanced twenty-five-year
sentence could be imposed, a prior conviction had to have “become final.”138 In
other words, after the amendment the person in the example above would now
face a fifteen-year mandatory, consecutive sentence (five plus five plus five)
rather than the fifty-five years because none of the three separate drug
transactions had resulted in a previously final conviction.
The centerpiece of the corrections reform in the FSA is the establishment of
an early release credit system that depends largely on two factors: a person’s risk
assessment score (using an algorithmic tool that is currently being developed)
and whether the offense of conviction excludes them from using the credits for
early release. With respect to firearm offenses, people convicted under Section
922(g) are not excluded from using the credits for early release, but those
convicted under Section 924(c) are (as are roughly half of all federally
incarcerated people based on their offense of conviction). It remains to be seen
how a person’s past firearm possession may impact the algorithm in a way that
could deny them release credits.
The FSA is notable both for what it does and does not do in the area of
firearms offenses. Earlier versions of the FSA took greater steps to ameliorate
some of the harshest gun-related sentences. For instance, an earlier version of
the bill which passed the Senate Judiciary Committee with bipartisan support
would have made the FSA’s change to Section 924(c) retroactively applicable
and would have reduced the enhanced twenty-five-year sentence to fifteen
years.139 That bill would have also reduced the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA) mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years to ten years and made
the provision retroactively applicable.140 The failure of Congress to do more than
alleviate one of several extreme penalty provisions for firearms offenses

137
138
139
140

Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993).
First Step Act § 403.
S. 2123, 114th Cong. § 104 (2015).
Id.
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suggests that meaningful legislation to reduce the scope of more typical gun
possession cases is not likely anytime soon.
Perhaps the most optimistic thing that can be said about the possibility of
reducing high sentences for gun possession is that some lawmakers have
proposed vehicles for sentence reduction that do not exclude firearm cases. For
example, several 2020 Democratic presidential candidates have called for the
elimination of mandatory minimums (without excluding gun possession
penalties), and Senator Corey Booker has introduced the Second Look Act that
would allow judges to revisit any sentence for people who have served over ten
years.141 Those proposals would help ameliorate the harshest sentences for
Section 924(c) and ACCA convictions, but they would likely have little impact
on the vast majority of Triggerlock prosecutions, most of which do not involve
mandatory minimum sentences.
B. The Judiciary
As with Congress, the prospects for a fundamental reshaping of federal gun
prosecutions coming from the Judiciary are dim. Early on, the Supreme Court
took a pass on the most obvious avenue to restricting the prosecutions by
requiring little in the way of a real connection to interstate commerce.142 But like
Congress, there have been incremental incursions by the Court with respect to
the most draconian sentencing provisions and beyond that, a slight narrowing of
the scope of Section 922(g).
Three significant Supreme Court criminal cases in the past five years deal
with firearms offenses. The first, Johnson v. United States,143 held that the socalled “residual clause” of the ACCA was void for vagueness under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Recall that ACCA creates a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years for anyone illegally possessing a firearm after
having been previously convicted of three “violent” felonies.144 The definition
of a violent felony includes a list of enumerated offenses, an “elements clause,”
and a residual clause that includes any felony that “involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”145 The initial
141
2020: The Democrats on Gun Control, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2019/10/10/2020-the-democrats-on-criminal-justice (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) (listing each of the major
candidates’ positions and noting Senator Booker’s Second Look proposal).
142
See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that proof that a firearm had
traveled at some point in interstate commerce was sufficient connection).
143
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562–63 (2015).
144
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
145
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
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question presented was whether Johnson’s prior conviction for possessing a
short-barreled shotgun qualified under the residual clause as a violent felony.146
After granting certiorari, the Court sua sponte requested briefing on whether the
residual clause was void for vagueness, even though the Court had quite recently
(twice in the preceding eight years) considered and rejected that claim.147 The
Court then answered the question in the affirmative, with Justice Scalia writing
for the 6-3 majority.148
And in the second case, United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court just last
year in a 5-4 ruling extended Johnson’s vagueness analysis to Section 924(c)’s
similarly worded residual clause, thus slightly narrowing one of the more
draconian firearm penalty provisions.149
The third case, Rehaif v. United States, applies directly to the bulk of
Triggerlock cases because it addresses the mens rea requirement of Section
922(g).150 The question presented was whether the government must show that
the person charged knew “both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he
possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was
a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like).” The Court answered
yes, overruling lower courts’ near-unanimous views that the person need not
know of their offending status. Although the decision adds to the government’s
burden and will help some defendants, it is not likely to impact the vast majority
of cases in which prosecutors will have a relatively easy time proving a
person’sknowledge of their own prior felony conviction.
In trying to discern the Court’s jurisprudence surrounding federal gun
possession prosecutions, a key question is whether the Court’s analysis should
be taken at face value or whether, similar to some interpretations of Lopez from
twenty-five years ago, the analysis should be seen as a reflection of the Court’s
view of other policy aspects of the prosecutions and sentences.151 There are
grounds for both views.
The face-value interpretation has plenty of support. The Rehaif majority
opinion was grounded in straightforward statutory interpretation without
broader discussion of the scope or wisdom of Triggerlock prosecutions. And
several decisions following Johnson indicate that it was not necessarily driven
146
147
148
149
150
151

Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id. at 2580.
Id. at 2563.
139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).
139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Beale, supra note 2.
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by gun-related policy concerns. For instance, the Court applied the Johnson
reasoning to a non-gun-related issue, the definition of crimes of violence in the
immigration context in Sessions v. Dimaya, and it failed to extend Johnson to
federal sentencing guidelines and the guidelines’ career offender provision in
Beckles v. United States.152 To the extent Johnson was influenced by the Court’s
displeasure with federal involvement in prosecuting gun possession cases or the
extreme severity of the sentences, the decisions in Dimaya and Beckles need not
have been decided as they were. There were ways for the Court to distinguish
Johnson’s analysis in the immigration context (by holding that a more relaxed
civil vagueness standard applied to immigration statutes) and for it to apply the
analysis in the guidelines context (by finding, as Justice Sotomayor argued in
concurrence, that because sentences are “anchored” by the guidelines, they too
are susceptible to vagueness challenge despite their non-binding nature).153
But the policy-influence interpretation has support as well. To begin, Justice
Kavanaugh starts his dissent in Davis with the following:
Crime and firearms form a dangerous mix. From the 1960s through the
1980s, violent gun crime was rampant in America. The wave of
violence destroyed lives and devastated communities, particularly in
America’s cities. Between 1963 and 1968, annual murders with
firearms rose by a staggering 87 percent, and annual aggravated
assaults with firearms increased by more than 230 percent.154

The opening continues with five more paragraphs detailing gun violence
statistics and the rising and falling of crime rates.155 “[A]fter 33 years and tens
of thousands of federal prosecutions, the Court suddenly finds a key provision
of § 924(c) to be unconstitutional because it is supposedly too vague.”156 Justice
Alito is similarly animated in his dissent in Rehaif, stating his displeasure with
narrowing Section 922(g)’s scope because “it probably does more to combat gun
violence than any other federal law.”157 To say that the dissents in both cases
were influenced by policy considerations would be a vast understatement.
But how much were the justices in the majority influenced in the same way?
Was their analysis colored by the extraordinary sentences that come with ACCA
and Section 924(c) and the public discourse from all sides of the political
spectrum about mass incarceration? Or was it affected by studies refuting the
152
153
154
155
156
157

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 903 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2337 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2201 (2019).
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impact of federal firearm prosecutions on reducing crime as argued by Justices
Kavanaugh and Alito? If so, the indications are less obvious than the dissents’
explicitly policy-driven view.
Although the cases are significant for the reasons discussed, Johnson, Davis,
and Rehaif are not likely to have much of an impact on the vast majority of gun
possession prosecutions. They will trim back some of the worst excesses of the
ACCA and Section 924(c), but they will not slow typical felon-in-possession
cases. Absent an unlikely about-face on the low interstate commerce bar, the
only realistic hope for the Judiciary to impact gun possession prosecutions is to
address the central reason for the existence of the PSN programs: severe
sentences. And that will likely need to come from the district courts employing
the reasoning of Judge Weinstein in Lawrence discussed above.158 If accepted
more broadly, Judge Weinstein’s conclusions would remove the primary reason
for federal gun prosecutions: improved public safety from the deterrent effects
of lengthy sentences.
Time will tell if federal judges begin to seriously examine the utilitarian
justifications for gun possession prosecutions. If they do, the impact could be far
more significant than the better known Supreme Court cases.
C. The Executive
Absent dramatic and surprising action from Congress or the Judiciary, a real
scaling back on federal gun prosecutions can only come from the place where
they began: the Department of Justice. As noted, the prosecutions did not begin
with a new law.159 The ramping up in the 1990s and steady increases in the 2000s
were almost entirely prosecutor-driven.160 The prosecutorial initiatives were
spurred by the small area of overlap in the Venn diagram of gun control politics:
conservative tough-on-crime policies and efforts to stave off broader regulation
crossing paths with the liberal desire to take action where possible and ward off
criticism from the right about enforcing the laws already on the books.161 That
bipartisan agreement led to a dramatic, and largely unquestioned, increase in
prison sentences for poor people of color.162

158
159
160
161
162

Supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A–B.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
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The question now is whether the “progressive prosecutor” movement in
some cities and “smart on crime” policies embraced by some conservatives will
extend to federal gun possession prosecutions. Thus far, there is little to suggest
they will. Even during the Obama Administration, when the number of firearm
prosecutions dipped from the Bush Administration highs, they were still 51%
higher than the last year of the Clinton Administration and were on an upward
trajectory from 2015 to 2016.163 The slight movement toward more progressive
policies under the Holder- and Lynch-led Justice Departments (most notably,
somewhat less frequent use of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases and
a reduction in authorized death penalty cases)164 did not include a revision to
Triggerlock prosecutions—or even to the “disreputable” stash-house sting
cases.165 Indeed, gun possession remained an exclusionary factor for the criteria
announced by Attorney General Holder allowing prosecutors to charge below a
mandatory minimum in certain drug cases.166
Under the Trump Administration, gun possession prosecutions have
continued their rise from the end of the Obama Administration. In his first year
as Attorney General, Jeff Sessions announced that he was “taking steps to
strengthen the PSN program and making clear that it is a Department
priority.”167 In response, federal prosecutors around the country have ratcheted
up gun possession prosecutions, with Fiscal Year 2019 on track to be the highest
total ever, surpassing the previous high in 2004.168 A recent press release from
the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago quoted Attorney General William Barr
touting the “revitalized Project Safe Neighborhoods program” and citing an
extraordinary increase in “federal firearm defendants” in the Northern District
of Illinois:
According to preliminary data for the 2019 Fiscal Year, which ended
September 30, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged more federal
firearm defendants than were charged in each of the prior 15 years.

163
Federal Weapons Prosecutions, supra note 22 (showing prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 were
4,461 in FY 2000 and 6,734 in FY 2016).
164
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., to U.S. Att’ys and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the
Criminal Div., Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements
in Certain Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013).
165
United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., concurring) (describing stashhouse stings as a “disreputable tactic”).
166
Memorandum, supra note 164 (listing criteria to “decline to charge the quantity necessary to trigger a
mandatory minimum” in drug cases and including “the defendant’s relevant conduct does not involve . . .
possession of a weapon”).
167
Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to all U.S. Att’ys, Project Safe Neighborhoods
(Oct. 4, 2017).
168
Federal Weapons Prosecutions, supra note 22.
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The number of charged firearm defendants in Fiscal Year 2019 was
44% higher than 2018, and 60% higher than 2017, according to
preliminary data.169

Looking to the future, if Trump is reelected, there is every reason to think the
high numbers of prosecutions will continue. If a Democrat is elected, the picture
is cloudier as none of the nominees have spoken to the issue even as they propose
broad “criminal justice reform” policies generally.170
Regardless of who controls the White House, one possible source of
pushback on the prosecutions are the state and local partners upon whom the
PSN programs depend. As noted, the majority of federal gun possession
prosecutions arise from arrests by local police.171 The U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
are often only aware of the cases because of their coordination with local police
and prosecutors. Absent that coordination, many cases could not be charged
federally. There are some signs already that local authorities are rethinking their
cooperation with federal joint task forces because of federal rules that conflict
with reform-minded police departments’ and district attorneys’ offices rules.172
At least five cities—Atlanta, Houston, San Francisco, Portland, and St. Paul—
have pulled out of joint task forces because of concerns about improper use of
force, prohibitions on the use of body cameras, and a general lack of
transparency in investigating troubling law enforcement incidents.173 Might
cooperation on gun possession cases be next?
In order for either local or federal prosecutors to scale back on gun
possession prosecutions, they will need to view them (or their political base will
need to insist that they view them) as needing reform in the same way that so
many other areas need reform. Can criminal justice advocates on either side of
the political aisle be convinced to push on this topic as strongly as they have
pushed on mandatory minimums, bail, marijuana, or police violence? And if so,
will those being pushed feel the need to listen? Thus far, we have not seen it.

169
Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office N. Dist. Ill., U.S. Attorney’s Office Announces Progress and
Ongoing Strategies in Combating Violent Crime in Chicago (Oct. 24, 2019).
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See German Lopez, Here’s Where Every 2020 Candidate Stands on Guns, VOX, https://www.vox.com/
2019/8/7/20756698/democratic-presidential-candidates-gun-violence-mass-shootings (last updated Dec. 5,
2019); Katie Park & Jamiles Lartey, 2020: The Democrats on Criminal Justice, MARSHALL PROJECT,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/10/10/2020-the-democrats-on-criminal-justice (last updated Jan. 24,
2020).
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See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Simone Weichselbaum, Why Some Police Departments are Leaving Federal Task Forces, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/10/31/why-some-police-departments-areleaving-federal-task-forces.
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Neither Holder nor Lynch (nor any of the Obama-era U.S. Attorneys) could
remotely be compared to reformist district attorneys like Larry Krasner in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania or Wesley Bell in Ferguson, Missouri.174 And the
criminal justice advocacy groups have not highlighted gun prosecutions as an
issue.
CONCLUSION
Guns will test the resolve of criminal justice reformers on the left and right.
Those on the left will need to stop supporting severe criminal sanctions as an
acceptable policy response to social ills like gun violence. It will require a
recognition that mass incarceration cannot be solved by only decrying
prosecutions for offenses out of favor on the left, like non-violent drug offenses.
And the right will need to apply the same big government skepticism and
empirical scrutiny of taxpayer expenditures even when that scrutiny is at odds
with tough on crime rhetoric or the NRA’s strategy of forestalling broader gun
control measures. Those are steep hills for both sides to climb. Perhaps the small
steps that have been taken in other areas will provide a path.
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Daniel A. Medina, The Progressive Prosecutors Blazing a New Path for the US Justice System,
GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/us-justice-systemprogressive-prosecutors-mass-incarceration-death-penalty.

